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RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAws-FoRUM NoN-CONVENIENS WHERE TiHE LAW OF AN
UNRECOGNIZED

COUNTRY IS INvoLvED-Plaintiff, a Massachusetts corporation

sued as assignee of certain deposits made in the defendant bank in London by
a Russian corporation prior to 1917. Plaintiff attached deposits of the defendant in Boston banks. Held, that jurisdiction was to be declined inasmuch
as the action could be maintained more suitably in England. Universal Adjustment Corporationv. Midland Bank Ltd., 184 N. E. 152 (Mass. 1933).
The court treated the action as one between two foreign corporations neither
having a place of business in the commonwealth. 1 Such parties have a standing
in the court merely from comity,2 and the court may decline jurisdiction in its
discretion." In tort actions it is declined rather frequently; 4 but in contract
actions the court usually retains jurisdiction.5 The court gave several vague
reasons for its action in the instant case,0 none of which seem strong enough to
justify declining the jurisdiction. The court then turned to the "further factor" T
involved which seemed to be the basis of its decision. The chief issue likely to
be raised on the merits would unquestionably be the validity of the assignment,
which would be governed (probably) by Russian law. After reviewing recent
English decisions on similar points, the court decided that the acquisition and
application of the law of an unrecognized country would be so onerous that it
would be much better to try the issues in an English court. The recognition or
non-recognition of Russia should not have affected the decision. The question
of recognition is purely political, and for the executive, not the courts; s but it is
not properly involved here. An unrecognized government can not sue 9 or be
sued 10 and its property is granted no immunity; 11 but the country over which
it rules is not a legal vacuum. A de facto government 1 must be admitted to
'Instant case at 157. This was an assignment of a non-negotiable chose in action and
although the assignee is permitted to sue in his own name he is subject to the same defenses
as his assignor.
2Watts, Watts & Co. v. Unione Austrica di Navigazione, 229 Fed. 136 (C. C. A. 2d,
1915) ; National Can Co. v. Weirton Steel Co., 314 Ill. 280, 145 N. E. 389 (1924); Stewart v.
Lichtenburg, 148 La. 195, 86 So. 744 (1921).
'Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 233 Mass. 522, 124 N. E. 281
(1919) ; Cofrode v. Gartner, 79 Mich. 332, 44 N. W. 623 (189o) ; State ex rel. Continental
Casualty Co. v. Homer, 239 Mo. 194, 143 S. W. 501 (1912); Waisikoski v. Phila. & Reading
Coal and Iron Co., 228 N. Y. 581, 127 N. E. 923 (192o).
'Great Western Ry. v. Miller, i Mich. 305 (1869) ; Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134
(N. Y. 1817).
'Roberts v. Knights, 7 Allen 449 (Mass. 1863) ; Peabody v. Hamilton, io6 Mass. 217
(187o) ; Johnston v. Trade Insurance Co., 132 Mass. 432 (1882) ; Smith v. Crocker, 14 App.
Div. 245, 43 N. Y. Supp. 427 (1895). Contra: Disconto Gesellschaft v. Terlinden, 127 Wis.
651, lO6 N. W. 821 (I90o6).
I Instant case at 159, i6o. The court gives as its reasons: great and needless expense to
the defendant; overcrowded courts; the contract was made in England and its nature, validity, obligation and legal incidents are governed by the law of that country; and the "further
factor" given in the text.
'Instant case at 16o.
'Luther v. Borden, 7 How. I (U. S. 1849) ; The Rogdai, 278 Fed. 294 (N. D. Cal. 192o).
'The Rogdai, supra note 8; Russian Soc. Fed. Soy. Rep. v. Cibrario, 198 App. Div. 869,
191 N. Y. Supp. 543 (1921) ; City of Berne v. Bank of England, 9 Ves. 347 (Eng. 1804);
Borchard, Can an Unrecognized Government Sue? (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 534.
" Wulfsohn v. Russian Soc. Fed. Soy. Rep., 234 N. Y. 372, 195 N. Y. Supp. 472 (1923).
'The Gagara, [1991] P. 95 (ship owned by Latvian government libeled) ; The Annette:
The Dora, [1919] P. io5 (ship owned by Esthonian government libeled).
2 Instant case at 162.
The court recognized the existence of the Soviet Government
although it went through the pointless procedure of construing the treaty with the Imperial
government. See also Wulfsohn v. Russian Soc. Fed. Soy. Rep., supra note io; Sokoloff v.
(870)

RECENT CASES
exercise within its territorial limits certain elements of sovereignty such as the
maintenance of a municipal law which would govern this assignment and which
the party interested must prove as he proves any other fact in his case. Such
law can readily be proven - and applied. To apply the proper Russian law in
this case would not be to grant recognition; it would be a proper recognition of
private rights based on the municipal law of a de facto sovereign. Such rights
have been protected in spite of non-recognition in many cases in the past 14 and
one state court has so acted in a situation involving this same country.', Surely
the courts of a civilized world should protect private rights even though the state
policy has chosen to use non-recognition as an economic and diplomatic bludgeon.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAwS-VALIDITY OF
CHAIN STORE TAx BASED ON OPERATION OF STORES IN MORE THAN ONE

COUNTY-A Florida statute,' in imposing a license tax on retail stores graduated
according to the number of stores operated under single ownership, assessed on
a higher scale stores operated in more than one county. Plaintiffs, who are a
number of chains operating throughout the state, contested the validity of the
act. Held, that the higher tax on stores operated in more than one county was
"unreasonable and arbitrary," and violated the i4th Amendment. Louis K.
Liggett et al. v. Lee et al., 53 Sup. Ct. 481 (1933).2
When in 1931 the Supreme Court handed down its far-reaching decision
in State Board of Tax Conm'rs v. Jackson,3 holding valid an Indiana statute
imposing a discriminatory tax on chain stores, a new way to check the growth
of chains was opened to the. states. There, the court permitted a progressive
increase in tax on each new store above a certain number operated within the
state as a whole. Here, objection was sustained to a license fee, graduated
according to the location of stores in more than one county of the state, the
effect of which was to impose, when a store was opened in a new county, a
higher tax on the total number of stores operated, thus raising the tax on all old
stores 4 The majority of the court held that the use of county lines as the basis
National City Bank, 120 Misc. 252, igg N. Y. Supp. 255 (1922) ; Severnoe Securities Corp.
v. Insurance Co., 255 N. Y. 12, 174 N. E. 299 (1931).
' The Soviet decrees were known to the court in the instant case. See p. i6o.
" Keene v. M'Donough, 8 Pet. 308 (U. S. 1834) (recognition of an adjudication by a
Spanish court in Louisiana after the cession but before America took possession) ; Home
Insurance Co. Case, 8 Court Cl. 449 (U. S. 1872) (recognition of incorporation by a special
act of the Georgia legislature during the Civil War) ; MacLeod v. United States, 229 U. S.
416, 33 Sup. Ct. 955 (1913) (payment of port duties to insurgents in control of a Philippine
-Island port during a rebellion allowed as a defense to payment of United States duties) ;
Van Deventer v. Hancke and Mossap, Transvaal L. R. [19o3] T. S. 4Ol (confiscation of
goods by decree of Boer Republic allowed as a defense for non-performance).
Severnoe Securities Corp. v. Insurance Co., supra note 12 (assignment by surviving
members of board of directors of a Russian corporation) ; James & Co. v. Rossia Insurance
Co., 247 N. Y. 262, 16o N. E. 364 (1928) (assignment by American manager of all assets of
a Russian corporation to a newly formed American corporation).
I FLA. Coimip. LAWs (Supp. 1932) § 4151 (82).
2

Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Cardozo dissented in separate opinions.

Mr.

Justice Stone concurred with Mr. Justice Cardozo.
3283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540 (1931). See also Legislation (1931) So U. OF PA. L.
REV. 289; Note (93)
31 COL. L. Rav. 145; Note (1931) 30 MicE. L. Rav. 274; Note (1931)
26 IL. L. REV. 240; cf. (1931) 4o YAi L. J. 431. See a prophetic article by Becker and
Hess, The Chain Store License Tax and the Fourteenth Amendmenwt (1928) 7 N. C. L.
REV. 112.

'See instant case at 484. Thus, if an owner operated 14 stores within one county and
opened another store within the same county, the tax on the additional store would be $io.
But if he opened the additional store in a different county, the tax would be $I5 on that store,
and the tax on the other 14 stores would be increased from $1o to $15 per store.
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of such increase was unreasonable and arbitrary. However, it might well be
contended that the county, a well-intrenched political subdivision of the state,
could reasonably be the basis for the levy of a tax.5 Moreover, the statute could
have been sustained on the ground that it was intended by the state to discriminate between "national" and "local" chains.6 The differences resulting
from a comparison of both types of chains are sufficient to justify legislative
distinction.7 That the state might have extended its protecting arm to the local
chain, as against the national chain, would follow from well-established
precedents." A state, by its taxing power, may impose heavier burdens on one
class, to the exclusion of another class, whenever it deems such action essential
to the advancement of the public good.9 That the states enjoy wide powers of
discretion in determining what is for the public good finds attestation in a long
line of cases. 10 It is apparent that the Court, in its present make-up, finds the
Jackson case as approximating the verge of cCnstitutionality with regard to chain
store taxation, and anything beyond its border will be refused judicial sanction."

CORPORATIONS-BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-MERGER-IGHTS
OF DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS TO "VALUE" OF THE SHAnFs-Plaintiff, a share-

holder in a building and loan association, gave notice to withdraw, but before
the thirty days required by statute elapsed' the association merged with the

defendant association, of which the plaintiff had notice. A few months later
the plaintiff sued at law to recover the appraised value of its stock at the time
See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo at 5o2.
' These are well-recognized distinctions in the business world. See CENSUS OF 1930,
REPORT ON RETAIL DISTRIBUTION BY CHAINS. See also, LEBHAR, THE CHAIN STORE . . .
BOON OR BANE? (1932) 20.
1 The national chain operates over a wider territory, it enjoys superior purchasing power,
broader diversification, greater capital, more concentrated advertising and management facilities. In the Jackson case, the court recognized the distinction between integrated chains and
voluntary, i.e., co-operative chains. To justify a tax the distinction need only be slight. See
the Jackson case, supra note 3. Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a
statute and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Sinking
Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 718 (1878) ; Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 544, 43
Sup. Ct. 394, 398 (1922). See Bikl6, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting
the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action (1924) 38 HARv. L. REv. 6. The majority
in the instant case refused to ascribe such an intention to the legislature (p. 484).
SQuong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 62, 32 Sup. Ct. 192, 193 (1911); Bell's Gap
Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 237, 10 Sup. Ct. 533, 535 (189o); American
Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 21 Sup. Ct. 43 (1900) ; Southwestern Oil Co.
v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 30 Sup. Ct. 496 (191o).
'American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, supra note 9; Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis
Co. et al., 240 U. S. 342, 36 Sup. Ct. 370 (1915) ; Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U. S. 226,
26 Sup. Ct. 232 (19o6); cf. Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 48 Sup. Ct.
553 (1928).
"Heath & Milligan Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338, 28 Sup. Ct. 114 (19o7) ; Mobile
County v. Kimball, lO2 U. S. 691 (188o); Fort Smith Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 251 U. S.
532, 40 Sup. Ct. 304 (192o) ; see Holmes, J., in Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.
S. 157, I6o, 161, 33 Sup. Ct. 66, 67 (1912) ; see FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGIsLATION (1917) 84-104.
See Howard, The Suprevre Court and State Action Challenged Under the Fourteenth
Amnendnent, 1931-1932 (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. Rsv. 505, at 557, 558. Mr. Justice Brandeis
would permit the Florida tax if only on the ground that it is imposed on a foreign corporation. In his vigorous and exhausting dissenting opinion he argues that the state bestows a
privilege on a foreign corporation when it permits the corporation to do business within the
state's borders and, therefore, the corporation is subject to any regulation which the state
deems it expedient to impose. He rationalizes at length a desire to discriminate against corporate invasions of small enterprise. See the problem raised in BIM AND MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) preface vii.
'Act of 1874, P. L. 73, § 37, cl.2, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 15, § 991.
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of the merger. Defendant objected that such value could not be obtained on a
present sale. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to the "real actual value" of
the shares at the time of the merger. Nice Ball Bearing Co. v. Mortgage Building and Loan Association, Pa. Sup. Ct., decided Jan. 16, 1933.
In order to limit the scope of the decision in the instant case and prevent
any possible misconstruction of it, the court clearly indicated that the plaintiff
was suing as a dissenting and not as a withdrawing shareholder. 2 The rights
of any class of shareholders 3 in these associations in Pennsylvania are vague
and many problems are yet unsolved. 4 The lack of adequate legislation partly
accounts for the confusion. The rights of dissenting or non-assenting shareholders of these associations are said to be similar to the rights of a like class in
ordinary corporations.5 They may enjoin the merger before it is completed,6
but after it is consummated they are entitled to the value of the shares at the
time of the merger 7 even though the new association is a nominal one s or the
old association was insolvent." The question of value plays an important role
in such cases and the court in the principal case, 10 though apparently pressed
with the argument that the appraisals were set too high considering market
conditions, manifested acceptance of an attitude which is prevalent in building
and loan circles. Obviously motivated by a desire to maintain some sensible
standard, the court reinforced by a practical and forceful recent opinion,"- adhered to the valuations set in the report of the Banking Department, which
values could not be obtained on any kind of present sale. The judgment in the
instant case was qualified by what has recently become a usual proviso,' 2 that a
reasonable time be given to the new association to pay this claim, arising "by
reason of their [plaintiffs'1 once having been shareholders". 1 The decision is
sound from a practical standpoint, in view of the tremendous amount of frozen
assets held by building and loan associations.
2The court stated that the plaintiff could not be a withdrawing shareholder of the old
association, since the 30 days had not elapsed, and so was still a shareholder of the old association; and that it could not be suing as a withdrawing shareholder of the new association
since it never was a shareholder in that association.
'For a discussion of the rights of shareholders of insolvent building and loan associations
see Note (1933) 81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 449.
'Book Review (933) 2 TEMPLE L. Q. 265. See also Sklar v. Maxwell Bldg. & Loan
Assoc., 163 Atl. 338 (Pa. 1932).
SUNDHEIm, LAw oF BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCrATIONS (3d ed. 1933) § 39a, at p. 39.
Simsohn v. Southern Cooperative Bldg. & Loan Assoc., 15 D. & C. 329 (Pa. I93I).
7 Ferrando v. U. S. Nat'l Bldg. & Loan Assoc., 307 Pa. 25, I6o Atl. 716 (1932).
8
Malamut v. Wilson Bldg. & Loan Assoc., I6 D. & C. 187 (Pa. 1931).
'Albert M. Greenfield & Co. v. Asset-Interest Bldg. & Loan Assoc., 14 D. & C. 567 (Pa.
I93I'It is interesting to compare the shareholder's dissent held sufficient
in the principal
case, with the dissent necessary in the case of national bank mergers, where it must be prompt,

definite and unequivocal.

See (1933)

8i U. OF

PA.

L. Rrv. 625.

Ferrando v. U. S. Nat'l Bldg & Loan Assoc., supra note 7. The court at p. 29 said:
"Stock may have several values; a market value, a speculative value or an. actual. value. Of
course, generally speaking, building and loan stock has no market value and the liquidating
price of assets fixed at a forced sale would be of little or no evidence of actual value."
' See Sperling v. Euclid Bldg. & Loan Assoc., 308 Pa. 143, I62 AtI. 2oi (1932). In Stone
v. Schiller Bldg. & Loan Assoc., 302 Pa. 544, 153 Atl. 758 (931) the court indicated that a
judgment was of little use, especially if the association subsequently became insolvent, for
the withdrawing shareholder who has a judgment has no preference over those remaining in
the association. See also Brown v. Victor Bldg. & Loan Assoc., 302 Pa. 254, I53 At. 349
(ig3i). Cf. the recent decision of Stern, P. J., in Hirsh v. Uniform B. & L. Ass'n, Legal
Intelligencer, March 31, 1933, p. 338.

"' The groups of creditors placed ahead of the plaintiffs were "public authorities" and
those "whose claims did not arise by reason of their once having been shareholders". The
classification was influenced by the fact that the court considers the relationship of the shareholders of these associations similar to that of partners. See also Brown v. Victor Bldg. &
Loan Assoc., supra note 12.
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CORPORATIONS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POWER OF LEGISLATURE TO MODIFY FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS FOR CORPORATE DEBTS--A
provision of the constitution of Minnesota,' imposing double liability upon
shareholders of domestic corporations, and operative at the time the X corporation was formed, was amended to give the legislature power to remove the
liability. 2 In accordance therewith, a legislative enactment was passed divesting
8
Subsequently, upon petition of a
the shareholders of their responsibility.
creditor whose claim accrued after the enactment, the X corporation was adjudged insolvent and its affairs placed in the hands of plaintiff, a receiver.
Plaintiff seeks to enforce double liability upon defendant, a shareholder. Held,
that defendant was liable. Whether or not creditors subsequent to the enactment were entitled to pro rata share in the amount due, need not be inquired
into, since the receiver was also the representative of prior creditors, whose
claims against shareholders were undoubtedly valid. Miller v. Ryan, 246 N. W.
465 (Minn. 1933).
The present case raises one of a number of related problems as to the
power of a state to change the financial responsibility of existing shareholders
for corporate debts as set by the articles of association or the law operative at
4
Upon the premise that contractual relations exist
the time of incorporation.
5
such
between state, corporation, and shareholders, by virtue of charter,
0
It has
problems have been reviewed in the light of the Federal Constitution.
been unanimously declared by courts an impairment of the obligations of contract that a statute by retroactivity should affect presently operative financial
rights 7 and duties s of shareholders. Hence, the decision in this case, that creditors with claims existent at the time of the legislative abridgment are protected,
is valid. But it has been generally agreed that financial duties of shareholders
CoNsT. Art. IO, § 3. MrNN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) xxxi.
'MINN. CoNsT. Art. 10, § 3. MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1931 Supp.)

I MINN.

9.

3 Minn. Laws, I931, c. 2o.
'Four factual situations will be considered: (a) claims against holders of shares whose
creation was authorized under a statute or constitutional provision imposing a liability which
is subsequently removed, (I) by creditors whose claims accrued prior to the removal, (2) by
creditors whose claims accrued subsequently thereto; (b) claims against holders of shares
whose creation was authorized under a statute or constitutional provision not imposing a liability which is subsequently imposed, (3) by creditors whose claims accrued before the enactment, (4) by creditors whose claims accrued subsequenly thereto.
A definition of terms appears necessary. By "financial responsibility" is meant the duty
or absence of duty of shareholders in a particular situation to pay creditors of an insolvent
corporation a certain amount. By "rights and duties presently operative" is meant the liability or non-liability of shareholders as set at the time of the authorization of the creation
of shares to creditors to whom corporate obligations already exist. By "rights and duties
arising in the future" is meant the contemplated liability or non-liability of shareholders as set
at the time of the authorization of the creation of the shares to creditors who may later hold
claims against the corporation.
The problems of interference of a state with intra-corporate relations, directly or indirectly affecting the shareholders financially, attempts of the majority of shareholders to
amend the corporate charter, the right of a state to amend corporate charters otherwise than
by modifying the present or future legal relations of shareholders to creditors, are not considered.
'Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U. S. 1819). Upon this
theory, the articles of association and creating laws may be found to embody a series of contracts and potential contracfs : (I) between state and corporation; (2) state and shareholder;
(3) corporation and shareholder; (4) state and persons dealing with the corporation; (5)
corporation and such persons; (6) shareholder and such persons.
6
Art. I, § 1o. The problems have apparently not as yet been referred to the Fourteenth
Amendment.
"United States v. Stanford, 69 Fed. 25 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1895).
'McDonnell et al. v. Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. et al., 85 Ala. 4O, 5 So. i2o (1888);
Stocker v. Davidson et al., 74 Kan. 214, 86 Pac. 136 (i9o6).
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arising in the future may be curtailed, 9 since no existing interests of creditors
are affected.10 On the other hand, the more difficult problem as to the power to
curtail privileges of shareholders to limitation of financial liability on corporate
debts arising in the future, has been resolved by declarations that any attempt
to impair such privileges is an unwarranted invasion of vested interests." Although the results the courts have reached in these varying situations appear on
the whole justifiable, an advocate of a more extensive governmental direction of
corporate relations may fail to see a legitimate reason why the state should not
operative
always be allowed the power to curtail financial rights of shareholders
2
A careful rein the future to the same extent that it may curtail duties.'
examination of the thesis that the relations of state, corporation and shareholders are in all particulars contractual,'- appears necessary, since, if this
premise be admitted, the conclusion logically follows that the legislature has no
such power.

COI 0ATIONs-DISTMunUTION OF ASSETS-RIGHT OF PIMFERRED SHAREHOLDERS TO SHARE IN SuiRpLuS BEYOND STATED PEFE aNCa-Articles of
association gave preferred shareholders a preference both as to dividends and

capital.' After payment of the creditors and the common and preferred shareholders in full there remained a surplus of i21,ooo in which the preferred shareholders claimed the right to share with the common shareholders. It was
shown that the surplus resulted from the accumulation of undistributed profits
for several years during which the common shareholders had received no dividends while the preferred shareholders had regularly received their dividends.
Held, that the preferred shareholders might share in such surplus. In re William
Metcalfe & Sons, Ltd., ['9331 I Ch. 142.
The right of preferred shareholders to participate in any surplus funds
remaining after the payment of the full par value to both the common and2
preferred shares is determined by the provisions of the corporate instruments.
In the absence of an express provision relating to participation as to capital upon
distribution it is held that the preferred and common shareholders have the same
"Rowland & Moyer v. Frost Park Creamery Co., 79 Kan. 139, 99 Pac. 213 (19o8);
Power v. Knapp, i58 N. Y. 733, 53 N. E. 13I (895).
11The interest of the corporation in the continuance of shareholders' financial responsibility is apparently not considered.
Haberlach v. Tillamook County Bank, 134 Ore. 279, 293 Pac. 927 (930) ; Steacy et al.
v. Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co. et al., 5 Dill. 348 (C. C. E. D. Ark. 1879). If, however, in
the law under which the creation of the particular shares was authorized, the state has expressly reserved the power to modify the law, a later legislative abridgment of the shareholder's privilege is held to be valid. Barth et aL. v. Pock et aL., 51 Mont. 418, 155 Pac. 282
(191); Bissell v. Heath, 98 Mich. 872, 57 N. W. 585 (1894).
" It is anomalous that the authorized representatives of a sovereign body should be forbidden, when the interests of that body are threatened, to take such measures as they may in
the exercise of their police power deem fit, even though such measures should call for increased financial responsibility of existing shareholders.
" It may well be suggested (I) that the state always impliedly reserves the power to
amend its laws; (2) that the law of corporations is sid generis and analogies from the law
of contracts should not be applied without limitation; (3). that the state, as promisor, is not
bound by any consideration which is the price of the promise.
1

Article 12 of the Memorandum of Association provided

".

.

.

the preference shares

shall confer the right to a fixed cumulative preferential dividend at the rate of 15 per cent.
annum, and the right in a winding up to repayment of capital in priority to -all other
per
shares".
2For a more complete discussion of this subject, see Note (1g31) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv.
466, at 470.
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rights.8 Where, as in the principal case, it is provided that the preferred shares
shall have a preference to the amount of the par value of their shares, without
reference to distribution of any surplus assets, the English rule is that the preferred shares retain the right to share in such fund.4 Only two American cases
have presented this problem and in both cases the agreement by which the preferred shares were bound provided that the preferred shares should be paid "in
full at par".' Despite the fact that such provision negatived any right to participate in surplus the American rule based on these cases, is often cited as contrary
to the English rule. In the instant case the court following the technique of the
English courts began with the presumption that all shareholders are entitled to
equal rights except where preferences or restrictions are expressly stated, 6 and
then held that a granting of "the right" to a preference in repayment of capital
was not intended as exhaustive of the rights of preferred shareholders upon the
voluntary winding-up.7 In the principal case the equities were with the common
shareholders since the surplus fund consisted entirely of earnings which, if distributed as earnings, would have been allocable only to the common shareholders."
The courts have failed to go beyond the terms of the contract in determining the
relative rights of the shareholders. It is submitted that where the contract fails
to grant or take away this right in express terms the court should inquire into
the source of the fund, title to which is in controversy.9 If the fund results
from a sale of capital assets it should then be distributed in the manner prescribed for capital distribution; if the fund arises from undeclared dividends
properly belonging to preferred and non-cumulative shares, it should be distributed to preferred shareholders as if it were a preferred dividend; and if, as
in the present case, the fund is accumulated by failure to distribute past earnings
3
Continental Insurance Co. v. Reading Co., 259 U. S. 156, 42 Sup. Ct. 540 (1922) and
cases cited therein. The English courts have generally refused to draw any inferences from
the grant of a right to a preference in dividends as showing an intention of the parties as
regards distribution of capital assets. Will v. United Lankat Plantations, Ltd., [1912] 2 Ch.
571; In re Fraser & Chambers, Ltd., [1919] 2 Ch. 114. But cf. It- re National Telephone
Company, [1914] I Ch. 755, 769 (holders of second preferred shares were held not entitled to
share in surplus because the right of participation expressly granted in regard to dividends
was omitted in the clause referring to capital).
"In -reEspuela Land & Cattle Co., [1909] 2 Ch. 187; In re Fraser & Chalmers, Ltd., supra
note 3; Anglo-French Music Co. v. Nicholl, [1921] I Ch. 386; In re John Dry Steam Tugs,
Ltd., [1932] I Ch. 594.
'William v. Renshaw, 220 App. Div. 39, 22o N. Y. Supp. 532 (1927) ; Murphy v. Richardson Dry Goods Co., 31 S. W. (2d) 72 (Mo. 1930).
' In lit re National Telephone Co., supra note 3, participation in surplus was refused the
preferred shareholders where the articles of association provided for a preference as to
dividends and also as to repayment of capital paid up, "but to no other participation in profits",
this clause being held to constitute an express restriction as to participation in surplus assets.
It is submitted that the two American cases, supra note 5, come within the rule of this case.
"In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly overruled Collaroy Company, Ltd. v.
Giffard, [1928] I Ch. 144, which was decided against the preferred shareholders on the theory
that a grant of "the right" to a preferred participation in capital to the extent of the par
value of the shares precluded the existence of any other rights as to capital distribution.
' The lower court expressly recognized this hardship, but felt that the terms of the contract required such participation and further that, since at all times prior to dissolution, the
common shareholders had voting control so that they could have distributed the surplus to
themselves in the form of dividends, the hardship was the result of their failure to act. It
is submitted that this latter reason is unsound because it penalizes an act done for the best
interests of the common enterprise. It would be extremely unwise for a court to discourage
the erection of corporate surpluses which serve as much-needed buffers against the storms of
business depression.
'Where current earnings remain undistributed, courts content themselves with treating
such earnings as capital and distributable as such. It is admitted that the administration of
such a test as is recommended'would require a detailed analysis of the financial records of
the corporation, which, however, is not objectionable if it subserves the ends of justice.

RECENT CASES

on common shares, then such distribution should be made upon the subsequent
dissolution. 10

CRIMEs-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-RE-INDICTMENT FOR MANSLAUGHTER AFTER
DISCHARGE OF THE JURY WITHOUT NECESSITY ON AN INDICTMENT FOR MUR-

DER-Defendant was indicted for murder. After the jury was sworn, it was
discharged by the court without any necessity for so doing. The prisoner was
then re-indicted for manslaughter and pleaded that the second trial was barred

by the constitution, which stated that no person should be twice placed in jeopardy of his life or limb.' Held, that since the defendant was not in jeopardy of
his life on the indictment for manslaughter, he was not protected by the constitution. Commonwealth v. Simpson, Pa. Sup. Ct., decided Feb. I, 1933.
At common law humane judges moved by the desire to save indicted persons from repetitious punishments for the same offense or from continual harassment by unfounded accusations of the same crime, devised the pleas of autrefois
convict and autrefois acquit.2 The constitutions of the various states and of
the federal government are commonly thought of as embracing these salutary
defenses, but the protection afforded the prisoner is even greater. This is due
to the fact that the courts have taken the view that the jeopardy which is guarded
against is not the danger of a second verdict but of a second trial,3 hence the
prisoner is considered as in jeopardy at the moment that the jury is sworn.4
Thereafter, a nolle prosequi, discontinuance I or discharge of the jury 6 without7
the consent of the defendant and where there exists no necessity for such action,
will operate in substance as an acquittal of the prisoner, for on a subsequent
trial the plea of double jeopardy is open to him. Hitherto there was no square
decision in Pennsylvania holding that under these circumstances the plea was
confined to a situation where both the first and second indictments were for
capital offenses, 8 although under a similar constitutional provision it has been
held that the plea covered all grades of crime. 9 Nevertheless in view of the uncertain meaning of the phrase "life or limb", the result achieved by the court
'"

Such a theory of distribution was given recognition in Niles v. Ludlow Valve Mfg.

Co., 196 Fed. 994 (S. D. N. Y. I912).

'PA. CONST., art. I, § io. "No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb."
'4 Br- CoMM. *335. To what extent a conviction or acquittal acts as a bar to prosecutions which might have been embraced in the first indictment, or for crimes which arise out
of the same act, is a field in itself unimportant for the purposes of this case.
'See Commonwealth v. Cook, 6 S. & R. 577, 595 (1822).
&I Bisirop, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) § 1014 (5).
People v. Disperati, II Cal. App. 469, io5 Pac. 617 (i9o) ; Briola v. People, 76 Colo.
489, 232 Pac. 924 (925) ; State v. Pittsburgh Paving Brick Co., 117 Kan. 192, 230 Pac.
,035 (924) ; State v. Linton, 283 Mo. I, 222 S. W. 847 (1920).
'Spelce v. State, 2o Ala. App. 412, IO3 So. 694 (924) ; People v. Mfontlake, 184 App.
Div. 578, 172 N. Y. Supp. io2 (I918) ; Commonwealth v. Hetrick, i Woodw. 288 (Pa.
1866)7 ; State v. Wilson, 91 Wash. x36, 157 Pac. 474 (i16).
That the court may discharge with the consent of the prisoner, see I WEARTON, CRimINAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) 549. Among the situations there listed as justifying a discharge
of the jury are (i) illness of prisoner, juror or counsel, (2) absence of a juryman, (3) impossibility of jurors agreeing upon a verdict, (4) some untoward accident rendering a verdict
impossible, or (5) some overwhelming physical or legal necessity.
8In Commonwealth v. Commander et at., io D. & C. 275 (Pa. 1926) there are strong dicta
supporting the court's conclusion. Actually, however, the decision turns on another point,
since there was no jeopardy in that case, because a complete jury was never completely sworn
in on the first trial. A contrary dictum may be found in Hilands v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa.
372,380 (885).
'See Berkowitz v. United States, 93 Fed. 452 (C. C. A. 3d, I899).
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does not seem unjustified, 10 although it remains to be seen whether the court will
carry the decision to its logical conclusion." However, the court's recognition
of an unqualified power in the trial judge of discharging the jury, subjects the
suspect to the hazard of several indecisive prosecutions for the same offense, and
while a discharge may not merit an acquittal, the right to insist on 2a verdict
should not thus be put entirely without the power of the prisoner.
EQUITY-INjuNCTIONS--POWER

OF COURT TO ENJOIN PROSECUTION OF

insured respondent against
the death of deceased. Upon his death, complainant brought this action in New
Jersey seeking cancellation of the policies on grounds of fraud. Respondent
sued at law in New York to recover on the policies. Complainant obtained a
AN ACTION IN FOREIGN JURISDICTION-Complainant

temporary injunction restraining prosecution of respondent's suit and now
moves to make it permanent. Held, that the injunction be made permanent.

PrudentialIns. Co. of America v. Merrit-Chapman & Scott Corporation, 163
Atl. 894 (N. J. Ch. 1932).
. After determining that the present controversy was first "in the possession
of" the court, and that therefore the "burden" of showing cause for shifting
the case to New York rested on the respondent,' the court proceeded to the
question of whether an inadequacy of the remedy at law existed upon which
to base equitable jurisdiction to give the relief sought.2 Two flaws in the New
York remedy were discovered. The court felt that since in New York the equitable defense of fraud, which was admittedly available to the complainant as
defendant there, would only be presented to the jury after the respondent showed
that a contract existed, that the complainant would "stand convicted before the
jury" before he could exonerate himself. While it is true that in New Jersey
a chancellor would sit to find facts," yet even there the complainant would,
0 It seems difficult to determine the significance of the term. At the time of the adoption of the constitution of the state, the only punishments known were imprisonments or
capital punishment. The phrase "or limb" is meaningless unless it be accorded the construction suggested in People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187, 20o (N. Y. 1820). There the court, upon
the mistaken supposition that the federal bill of rights applied to state procedure, construed
the Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution as covering those crimes which would
have been punished by loss of limb at common law. In W~rrE, CONSnUTION OF PENNSYLVANiA (1907) 107, it is stated that "The first observation to be made concerning the clause is
that it applies only in capital cases."
'Logically it should now be possible for the state to appeal from acquittals in criminal
cases because of error in the trial court. This situation exists only in Connecticut and in no
other state. See Comley, FormerJeopardy (1925) 35 YALE L. J. 674.
' While there seems no way in which the trial court can be forced to acknowledge such
a right in the defendant. it is felt that a pronouncement from a superior court admonishing the courts to use this power cautiously would be of sufficient coercive effect. In
Regina v. Winsor, L. R. I Q. B. 289 (1866) the court, while frowning on an arbitrary discharge, admitted that there was no practical method of enforcing any such right in the prisoner. In the federal courts the rule seems to be that it is within the discretion of the judge,
but is a right which is not to be exercised arbitrarily and only where some necessity exists.
United States v. Perez, 22 U. S. 256 (1824).
'Principal case at 898.
'The power of an equity court to restrain one within its jurisdiction from instituting or
prosecuting an action in a court of foreign jurisdiction has long been recognized. See Portarlington v. Soulby, 3 Myl. & K. 104 (Eng. 1834) ; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup.
Ct. 269 (189o) ; 2 SToRY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (I4th ed. 1918) §§ 1224, 1225.
' Courts are quite naturally loath to interfere with others, and, as a result, a "presumption" that another court will give a fair trial has been established, which, in fact, is merely
evidence of the comity of courts and is of course rebuttable in certain situations. There
seems to be no reason in law why the verdict of the jury should be less desirable than that of
the chancellor. See Lancaster v. Dunn, 153 La. 85, 95 So. 385 (1922), where the denial of
an injunction deprived the complainant of the opportunity for a judicial review of a jury's
verdict.
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by asking for cancellation, admit that there was extant a contract valid on its
face. This procedural comparison seems to point to no inadequacy. However,
the second ground is of decidedly more weight. The sole witness who was to
be introduced to prove the fraud was disqualified from testifying in New York.'
Although it is generally admitted that a plaintiff is entitled to seek the forum
that offers him the greatest procedural advantage, yet most courts of equity
will restrain such action when the privilege is used in an "inequitable and unconscionable manner"." The courts state that where the only grounds for equitable relief are differences in rules and practice, the action will not be interfered
with,7 yet where the procedural difference resulted in denying to the complainant a defense which he otherwise would have, the contrary result has been
reached." In the principal case there is no doubt that the procedural rule would
result in a complete exclusion of the complainant's equitable defense, and certainly the court was correct, even without the support of precedent, in granting
the relief and providing complainant with a complete and adequate remedy. 9

-viDENCE-STERILITY-PRESUMPTION OF CONTINUED CAPACITY TO BEAR

CHILDREN-Testator left the income of his estate to his daughter for life, with

remainder to certain charitable institutions if she died without issue. A statute :
provided that the amount of a gift to charity might be deducted from the gross
estate of the testator in computing the estate tax. Prior to the testator's death,
the daughter underwent an operation which rendered her incapable of bearing
children. The trustee brought an action to recover overpayment of taxes. Held,
that the evidence of the operation was admissible to show the vesting of the remainder in the charity. Provident Trust Co. v. United States, 2 Fed. Supp.
472 (Court CL. 1933).
In England the courts have frequently acted on the inference that women,
under various circumstances of age and other conditions, have become incapable
of bearing children,2 but in a number of other cases have declined to presume
This witness was a doctor and was barred by N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT (1920) § 352.
See Pound, The Progressof the Law (I92O) 33 HARv. L. Rrv. 42o, 427.
This phrase is the normal apology for taking action, and as shown in the cases infra
note 8, no definite rules have been established for classifying situations.
'Missouri, etc. R. Co. v. Ball, 126 Kan. 745, 271 Pac. 313 (1928) (unanimous jury verdict not
required) ; (1930) 9 TEx. L. REv. p1, 92.
8
Culp v. Butler, 69 Ind. App. 668, 122 N. E. 684 (1918) (statute of limitations avoided);
Weaver v. Alabama G. S. R. Co., 2oo Ala. 432, 76 So. 364 (1917) (difference in contributory
negligence rule). But see Note (1919) 33 HARv. L. Rav. 92, 94, where the writer approves
of cases holding directly contra to the two mentioned supra.
'The only other case that is factually similar to the principal case is Webster v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 131 App. Div. 837, 116 N. Y. Supp. 404 (1909), where the court restrained a respondent from suing in Massachusetts for cancellation on grounds of fraud to
be proved by a doctor barred in New York, after the trial at law in New York had been
listed for trial. This case is distinguishable in that the policy had, a noncontestability clause
that seemed to bar the insurance company from pleading fraud in the particular case.
'REVENUE ACT of 1918, § 403 (a) (3), 40 STAT. 1098. A similar provision may be found
in each of the subsequent revenue acts.
- These range from Leng v. Hodges, Jac. 585 (Eng. 1822), where the woman was 69,
married, and had had two children, to Re Summers's Trusts, 30 L. T. Rep. (N. s.) 377 (Eng.
1874), where the woman was 47, had had six children by her present husband but had not
beet pregnant for 17 years, and there was medical testimony that she was suffering from a
disease which made it "improbable, if not impossible" for her to have further issue. See also
In re White, [I9OI] I Ch. 570, where the woman was 56, a widow, and had had one child 34
years previously, and it re Widows' Trusts, L. R. II Eq. 4o8 (Eng. 1871), where one woman
was a widow aged 55 who had never had any children, and the other a spinster aged 53. See
2 DANIEML, CHANCERY PRACTICE (8th ed. 1914) 1540; LAwsoN, PREsUmPTIVE EVIDENCE (2d
ed. 1899) 364.
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against incapacity. In reconciling these cases, it has been stated that4continued
thereby, but such
capacity will be presumed, where property rights are affected
5
a conclusion does not seem to be justified by the cases. In the United States,
however, a woman is conclusively presumed to be capable of childbearing at any
age of adult life." It is difficult to determine the precise grounds upon which
the American rule is rested: those which are usually advanced are the indelicacy
7
of the inquiry and the uncertainty of the result. Although the courts are daily

receiving evidence against which the charge of indecency might more justly
agreement
be leveled, 8 and although the medical authorities are in substantial
9
as to the impossibility of having children after the menopause, it is quite pos2
These range from Jee v. Audley, i Cox Eq. 324 (Eng. 1787), where the woman was 70,
married, and had had four children, to Groves v. Groves, 12 W. R. 45 (Eng. 1863), where the
woman was 49, had given birth to no child for over 20 years, and there was positive medical
evidence that she was past childbearing. In the latter case the court stated that its "settled
rule was, that no woman below the age of 50 should be treated as beyond the possibility of
bearing a child". See DANIELL, loc. cit. supra note 2.
"Hill v. Sangamon L. & T. Co., 295 Ill. 619, 621, 129 N. E. 554, 555 (1921): "In England the courts have in some cases acted upon the inference that women under various circumstances of age and other conditions have become incapable of bearing children, but in
some of the English courts it has been held that such incapacity will never be presumed
where the devolution of property is thereby affected." See also the discussion of the English
authorities in Flora v. Anderson, 67 Fed. 182 (C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1895).
'An examination of the cases cited supra note 2, will show that in many of them the
devolution of property was affected by the presumption of incapacity. It would seem that
the courts which adopt this statement are more interested in justifying what they consider an
irrational but established rule than they are in stating the true import of the cases.

'Flora v. Anderson, supra note 4; Farrington v. Commissioner, 13 B. T. A. 274 (1928),

aff'd 30 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. Ist, 1929) ; In re Dougan, 139 Ga. 351, 77 S. E. 158 (1912) ;
Hill v. Sangamon L. & T. Co., supra note 4; Ricards v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 97 Md.
6o8, 55 Atl. 384 (1903) ; List v. Rodney, 83 Pa. 483 (1877) ; Bowlir, v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 31 R. I. 289, 76 Aft. 348 (191o). Contra: In re Apgar, 37 N. J. Eq. 501
(1883), rev/d on other grounds in 38 N. J. Eq. 549 (1884) ; Male v. Williams, 48 N. J. Eq.

33, 21 Atl. 854 (1891). As to the presumption of the continued capacity of men, see Lomax
v. Holmden, 2 Str. 940 (Eng. 1795) ; Gardner v. State, 81 Ga. 144, 7 S. E. 144 (1888) ; People
v. Row, 135 Mich. 505, 98 N. W. 13 (19o4) ; Shuford v. Brady, 169 N. C. 224, 85 S. E. 303
(1915).
'The most frequently quoted language is that of List v. Rodney, supra note 6, at 492:
"We may concede that she has passed the age where the ability to bear children usually continues; [the woman was over 751 yet the law appears to have settled that there is no age
beyond which it is impossible. . . . Whether the rule rests upon the indelicacy of the acts
to which such an inquiry might lead, or to the great uncertainty of arrriving at an accurate
conclusion, we know not; but certain it is, the rule has stood the test of time, and received
the sanction of ages. . . . Nature has fixed no certain age, by years, at which a childbearing capacity shall begin or end. Any conjecture based on age is too doubtful and uncertain to result in any reliable conclusion." The courts also cite Coke and Blackstone with an
air of finality, without considering the advance of medical knowledge since their day. Co.
LiT. *28: "The law seeth no impossibility of having children"; 2 BL. COMM. *125: "A possibility of issue is always supposed to exist, in law, unless extinguished by the death of the
parties, even though the donees be each of them an hundred years old."
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ io, ii, after stating that "All facts having
rational probative value are admissible, unless some specific rule forbids", points out that
there are certain rules of extrinsic policy which "concede that the evidence in question has
all the probative value that can be required, and yet exclude it because its admission would
injure some other cause more than it would help the cause of truth, and because the avoidance of that injury is considered of more consequence than the possible harm to the cause of
truth". He sets these forth as indecency, impropriety, inconvenience, and illegality, 4 id.
§§ 2175 ff., but the indecency to which he refers is more definitely morally reprehensbie than
that involved here. See also the language of Lumpkin, J., in Johnson, v. State, 14 Ga. 55, 62
(1853) : "Truth, common sense, and enlightened reason, alike demand the abolition of all
those artificial rules which shut out any fact from the jury, however remotely relevant, or
from whatever source derived, which would assist them in coming to a satisfactory verdict."
92 TAYLOR, MEIcA.L JuRsPauDENcE (8th ed. 1928) 17ff. states that it is undoubtedly
the general rule that a woman is sterile after the cessation of menstruation, but cites several
exceptions. Other exceptions may be found in the reporter's note to Miller v. Macomb, 26
Wend. 228, 234 (N. Y. 1841). The chief concern of the writers seems to be, however, the
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sible that these considerations are entitled to some weight in cases where the
incapacity must be found from evidence of age and from the opinion-testimony
of doctors.' 0 But where the sterility is the result of an operation, as here, such
contentions should not be allowed to deter the court from seeking the true facts,11
and the liberal attitude of this court should be followed.

GAMING-CONFLICT OF LAWS-APPLICABILITY OF STATE STATUTE TO A
CONTRACT OF AGENCY TO DEAL IN GRAIN FUTURES ON A "CONTRACT MARKET"

SANCTIONED

BY

FEDERAL LAw-The plaintiff, a grain broker in Missouri, in

response to orders through its agent from the defendant, a customer also in
Missouri, entered into contracts in Illinois and elsewhere to purchase and sell
future grain as authorized by United States statute.' The express agreement
required delivery, but the mutual understanding, complying with the usual custom, was that it would not be demanded, settlement to be based on the difference
between the original price and that of a later contract to be used to off-set and
cancel the original obligations 2 The broker sued for commissions due from
these transactions. Held, (three justices dissenting) 3 that the contract between
broker and customer not having contemplated an actual purchase and sale outside
of Missouri, was tested by the laws thereof, and by such laws was illegal as
gambling.4 Dickson et al. v. Uklminn Grain Co., 53 Sup. Ct. 362 (1933).
question of when menstruation ceases;
ed. 1907) 643 ff.

2 WTTHAUS

& BECKER,

MEDicAL JURiSPRUDENCE (2d

"The dissenting opinion in Farrington v. Commissioner, supra note 6, at 916, puts the
problem thus: "Legally, the question is whether Revenue Act 1921, c. 136, 42 Stat. 227, is
to be construed as adopting the legal fiction (presumption) that a woman, of whatever age
or physical condition, is childbearing. If the truth is admissible in applying this act, it is
undisputed that this life tenant is not childbearing; the government rests its case solely on
the fiction, claiming that the truth (shown in evidence) must be disregarded. Undoubtedly
the presumption is generally adopted in England and the United States [citing cases]. But
it is not universally held not open to a showing of the real facts [citing cases]. Charitable
gifts are always favored by the law, as is shown by the broad and liberal application of the
cy pres doctrine."
'Just six days before the opinion in the principal case was handed down, the Board of
Tax Appeals, in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, B. T. A. Docket No. 45500, Jan. 31,
1933, took the opposite view on an identical set of facts. The decisions setting up a presumption of continuing capacity in cases where age alone was relied upon to negative it were
cited by the Board, without any discrimination as to the certainty of the evidence offered in
the two cases. This case and the principal case seem to be the only two decided to date in
which the evidence offered to negative the presumption of child-bearing capacity consisted of
an operation of this character.
' Grain Futures Act, 42 STAT. 998 (1922), 7 U. S. C. A. § 1-17 (1927), authorizing the
Secretary of Agriculture to designate certain exchanges as "contract markets" upon, which
members by complying with elaborate rules may deal in futures.
A simplified illustration is where A contracts to deliver to B two months later iooo
bushels of X wheat at so much per bushel. Then, any time before delivery date, the contract is settled by B contracting to deliver to A the same amount and quality of wheat. Instead of exchanging wheat, the parties exchange the difference in price. Note (I927) 40
HIv. L. REv. 638. The "future" does not refer to any specific lot of grain, and the parties
usually reserve the right to close out also by transferring their rights or obligations to third
persons. See BAER AND WOODRUFF, COMMODITY EXCHANGES (1929) 5-9.
'The dissenting opinion by Butler, J., concurred in by Stone and Cardozo, JJ., points out
at 366, that the plaintiff, operator of large grain elevators, does not come within the Missouri statute, infra note 4, which condemns "bucket-shops". The essence of a bucket-shop
is the broker assuming a position opposite to that of the customer, gambling on fluctuation
of the market. The modern method is actually to buy the future and then, unknown to the
customer, close it out. This clearly was not the instant case. See Hoffman, Governmnt
Regulation of Exchamges (i93x) 155 ANN. Am. AcAD. POL. AND Soc. ScI. 42-43.
'Mo. REv. STAT. (I929) § 4318.
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Missouri, along with several other states, 5 has by statute codified the common-law rule that a contract for future grain that is to be settled not by delivery
but by payment of difference in price, is illegal as gambling. 6 Federal courts,
however, when the transaction occurs on an exchange operated under authority
of the Secretary of Agriculture, have appreciated the economic value in speculative buying,7 and have introduced the fiction that a "set-off" or contract to
cancel the obligations of the original agreement, constitutes delivery, and the
entire transaction, including that between broker and customer, is valid. s State
courts, realizing that their statutes do not apply to the contract between brokers
in another state, have even permitted the federal rule to validate the contract of
agency between customer and broker, even though the latter contract was executed within their state and was contrary to a policy of their legislation. 9 The
statute involved in the instant case condemns as gambling, transactions, "wherein
there is, in fact, no actual purchase and sale".'" The court divided on the issue
of whether the evidence showed that the customer authorized a purchase by the
broker outside of Missouri. However, the customer admitted that he intended
his orders to be executed, as they were, on foreign exchanges, and that the commissions sued for were earned. Such a state of facts seems to bring the contracts within the scope of the federal law and to make immaterial the issue of
whether there were actual purchases or sales within the meaning of the Missouri
statute." None of the evidence discussed by the majority justified the conclusion
that the customer did not intend to have the contracts performed outside of
Missouri.12
I Note (932)

45 HAzv. L. REV. 912, 917, 918. The principal test of legality is whether

there was an intention to deliver when the contract was made.
I Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 4324, under which it was held that the broker cannot get his
commissions even though he was not aware of the customer's intention not to deliver, Price
v. Barnes, 30o Mo. 216, 245 S. W. 33 (1923).
'See 3 Wn1r. STON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1671; Hoffman, The Hedging of Grain (i931)
155 ANN. Am. AcAD. POL AND Soc. ScI. 7; Stevens, Relationship of Cash and Future Prices,

id. at 79. The statutes of two states recognize the inadequacy of the common-law rule, and
sanction a form of set-off instead of delivery. FLA. Coap. LAws (1927) § 7899; TzXN.
CODE (1932) § 11308.
'Board of Trade v. Christie, 198 U. S. 236, 25 Sup. Ct. 637 (igo5); Cleage v. Laidley,
149 Fed. 346 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o6) ; Gettys v. Newburger, 272 Fed. 209 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921).
But there must not be an agreement not to deliver, as contrasted with an intention. Sampson
v. Camperdown Mills, 82 Fed. 833 (C. C. D. S. C. i897). Cf. Thacker v. Hardy, 4 Q. B. D.
68 (1878) ; Earl v. Howell, 14 Abb. N. C. 474 (N. Y. x884)' (not illegal if broker actually
makes a purchase on the exchange).
'Edwards Brokerage Co. v. Stevenson, i6o Mo. 516, 61 S. W. 617 (90) ; Atwater v.
Brokerage Co., 147 Mo. App. 436, 126 S. W. 823 (i9io). The language of the opinions,
however, carefully points out that the states are not bound to enforce contracts contrary to
policy expressed in statutes, but do so as a matter of comity. In Claiborne Co. v. Stirlen, 262
S. W. 387, 388 (Mo. App. 1924) the court said, "Of course, the contract of' agency was a
Missouri contract, but the matter is not to be tested by that contract, but . . . by the law of
the state where the agent actually conducted the purchases." The facts were almost identical
with those of the instant case. Thus, many courts have held that the contract between customer and broker is tested by the law regulating the exchange upon which the futures are
sold. Gaylord v. Duryea, 95 Mo. App. 574, 69 S. W. 6o7 (1902) ; Lyons Milling Co. v. Goffe
& Carkener, 46 F. (2d) 241 (C. C. A. xoth, i93i); Mullinix v. Hubbard, 6 F. (2d) io9 (C.
C. A. 8th. 1925) ; Hoyt v. Wickham, 25 F. (2d) 777 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
" Supra note 4.
'This would seem to follow by analogy with the situation where the court elects to enforce the contract between broker and customer even though it would be illegal if it had
required performance within the state. The statute here involved does not apply to agency,
but to purported purchases and sales; if these are executed outside of the state, then the
statute gives place to the law of that other state. See supra note 9. If by that law the transactions are lawful, as they are here by federal statute, it would seem that the same policy
should operate to permit recovery o f commissions, as it has been held to operate when the
issue was the legal significance of an intention not to deliver.
The evidence was that the defendant customers never intended to deliver, that they
were not in the grain business and had no means to fulfill their contracts, and that they
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MORTGAGES-DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT-JUDICIAL NOTICE THAT THE "DEPRESSION" HAS RESULTED IN LACK OF BIDDERS AT FORECLOSURE SALES-Upon

mortgagee's application for the confirmation of a foreclosure sale and the award
of a deficiency judgment the lower court judicially noticed that economic depression had adversely affected market values of realty, because of a lack of competitive bidders, resulting in a sale on foreclosure at a price far beneath both
"fair value" and the amount of the mortgage indebtedness. The sale was confirmed but upon a finding that the "fair value" of the land was equal to the mortgage indebtedness the court refused the petition for a deficiency judgment. From
this refusal the mortgagee appealed. Held, that the court acted properly in its
desire to apply the "fair value" of the land against the mortgage indebtedness;
that, however, the mortgagee should have been tendered the option of accepting
the court's action or of having the property resold after the court had fixed a
"fair value" as the minimum price. Suring State Bank v. Giese, 246 N. W.
556 (Wis. 1933).

It is generally stated that, after foreclosure, the holder of a mortgage may
sue for the deficiency and so long as the sale stands the sale-price upon foreclosure is conclusive between the parties.1 The instant court would thus in
effect seem to be exercising its equitable powers in overturning a sale where the
fact of an inadequate price is coupled with an emergency which operates to prevent competitive bidding-assuming that the economic depression is such an
emergency. Generally, courts have taken notice of financial stringencies and depressions 2 but have nevertheless refused, on these grounds, either to enjoin
or to set aside foreclosure sales of mortgaged realty,3 because (I) the courts
would become instruments of speculation on future property values, 4 and (2)
mortgagees are entitled to a high degree of protection.5 In cases, however,
where courts are concerned less with disputes between a debtor and a creditor
than with the problem of the protection of a group of creditors against the taking of action by one of the group, they are less loath to grant equitable relief
closed out for profits based on price fluctuations. Clearly, this goes no further than to show
that the defendants were speculating in grain. As the dissent points out, each transaction,
though required to be between brokers as principals, yet was in the name of the customer,
and confirmed in writing. It was not a wager with the broker, for he did not lose if the
customer won, as would be the case if the actual bucket-shop existed, in which no future contract is entered into at all. Supra note 3.
23 JoNEs, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) §§ 1583, 2206.
'Note the court's language in Nebraska Loan Co. v. Hamer, 4o Neb. 281, 288, 58 N. W.
695, 697 (1894) : "It would hardly require evidence to satisfy the court that August of 1893
was not a propitious time for the forced sale of land, but we cannot see how the courts can
interpose upon such grounds for the protection of unfortunate debtors." For other instances
where the court took judicial cognizance of the depression see San Francisco v. Collins, 13
P. (2d) 912 (Cal. 1932) (recognition of need for poor relief) ; Calihan v. Yellow Cab Co.,
13 P. (2d) 931 (Cal. 1932) (recognition of change in purchasing power of dollar in award
of damages) ; Leeper Oil Co. v. Rowland, 239 Ky. 295, 39 S. W. (2d) 486 (ig3i) (court
refused
to declare forfeited a lease for the development of oil lands).
3
Miller v. Parker, 73 N. C. 58 (1875) ; Bolich v. Prudential Ins. Co., 2o2 N. C. 789, 164
S. E. 335 (1932), (1933) 19 VA. L. REv. 420, (1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 87, (933) 11 N.
C. L. REv. 172; Floore v. Morgan, 175 S. W. 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) ; Commonwealth
Bank & Trust Co. v. MacDonnell, 49 S. W. (2d) 525 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Muller v.
Bayley, 21 Gratt. 521 (Va. 1871) ; Muller's Adm'r v. Stone, 84 Va. 834, 6 S. E. 223 (1888) ;
Caperton v. Landcraft, 3 W. Va. 540 (1869); see Park v. Musgrove, 2 Thomp. & C. 57I
(N. Y. 1874). But sed Sinclair Refining: Co. v. Midland Oil Co., 55 F. (2d) 42 (C. C. A.
4th, 1932) (injunction restraining sale of land because of general economic depression held
not to be an abuse of judicial discretion).
"Lipscomb v. New York Life Ins. Co., 138 Mo. 17, 39 S. W. 465 (897).
See Anderson v. White, 2 App. Cas. 408, at 417 (D. C. 1894) ; Miller v. Parker, supra
note 3, at 6o. Also see the report of the statement of Judge Horace Stern in the Common
Pleas Court of Philadelphia in denying a motion to forbid an eviction, reprinted in The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, March 9, 1933, at 8.
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because of depressed economic conditions. So in refusing the application of
an extremely minor creditor for the appointment of a receiver it was recognized
that granting such an application would be detrimental to the greater group
of creditors, inasmuch as a receivership would ultimately result in a sale of
corporate assets at a time when a market was non-existent because of business
depression.' Likewise since economic upheavals are recognized as proper reasons for deviations from the terms of a trust, the petition of a trustee for bondholders to permit his taking a new form of security rather than necessitating
foreclosure of mortgages held by way of security was granted because of the
unsatisfactory condition of the real estate market.' Precedent may dictate that,
in a dispute between two parties, courts, even of equity, must regretfully disregard economic disturbances and leave the matter for the legislators." In times
of catastrophic emergencies such as war, however-and this "depression" has
been said to be akin to a war--courts, recognizing the dilatory tendencies of
legislators, have hewn out a rough sort of justice in keeping with the emergency. 9
The instant court seems to have done just that ' 0 avoiding the necessity of awaiting tardy legislation." After preparation of this report upon the principal case
a decree was rendered in the case of First Union Trust and Savings Bank v.
Division State Bank, 2 wherein the chancellor went far beyond the principal case
and expressly forbade the mortgagee from pursuing foreclosure proceedings
until changed economic conditions justified such a course, upon the condition
that the mortgagor would retain control of the property as quasi-receiver to
manage the property and apply the net income, after meeting operating charges,
to a reduction of the mortgage indebtedness. The court recognized the "depression" as a calamity as great as a war and as being so destructive of the real-estate
market that foreclosure would ultimately result in acquisition by the mortgagees
of both the property foreclosed and a deficiency judgment virtually equal to the
mortgage indebtedness. The court claimed the discretionary right as a court of
conscience, rather than as a court bound by inescapable precedent, to prevent
this apparent injustice to owners of realty who, through no fault of their own
but because of general conditions, were not to blame for their inability to pay.
The court also stated that such measures were necessary to a restoration of
general confidence and a prevention of further collapse of real-estate values.
ITachna & Albertson v. Pressed Steel Car Corp., 164 Atl. 413 (N. J.Eq. 1933).
'New Jersey Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Lincoln Mortgage & Guaranty Co., lO5 N. J.

Eq. 557, 148 At. 713 (i93o) ; Note (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. Ray. iooo (the court here was of
the opinion that "real estate values are actually existent; it is the market which is temporarily
lacking and which will eventually return"). It. re New, [19oi] 2 Ch. 534, at 545.
' See authorities cited supra notes 3, 4 and 5. But note the action taken by Judge Kneutze
o.f Camden, N. J., in granting delinquent lessees an extension before eviction. The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, March 8, at 3. See TIME, Feb. 13, 1933, at 12, 13.
'It has been recognized by a leading European jurist and legal scholar that the World
War resulted in so great a distortion of the earlier legal concepts and intents of contracting
parties that the courts were compelled to intervene in the fight for continued economic existence. In the absence o~f emergency legislation the courts, of necessity, had to create new legal
norms and render "their judgments with more fidelity to economic facts, with more general
utility, with greater justice than would have been possible through statutes conceived in the
past upon the basis of totally different postulates and world conditions." Sperl, Case Law
and the European Codified Law (1925) ig ILL. L. REV.505, at 517. Note also the dissenting
opinion of Cardozo, C. J., in Graf v. Hope Building Corp., 254 N. Y. I, 8, 171 N. E. 884, 888
(1930) flaying equity's tendency to rigidity, saying: "Equity follows the law, but not slavishly or always."

These views are subscribed to in (1933) II N. C. L. Rnv. 172, 174; (1932)

81 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 87, 88; (933) ig VA. L. REv. 42o, 421. Also see Sinclair Refining Co.
v. Midland Oil Co., supra note 3; Tachna & Albertson v. Pressed Steel Car Co., supra note 6.
" The principal case is favorably reviewed in (1933) 17 MARQ. L. REv. 154.

It is interesting to note that such legislation is under consideration by both the Federal
and State governments. See "Bills in State Legislatures", U. S. Daily, Feb. 24, 1933, at 2218;
also see U. S. Daily, March 25, 1933, at 7, April I, 1933, at 45.
' Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, General Number B 262438, April I, 1933.
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SALES-UNIFORM SALES ACT SECTION 20 (2)-FORM OF BILL OF LADING
AS AFFECTING

TRANSFER

OF

TITLE-In pursuance of his contract for the sale

of certain goods, vendor shipped the goods, taking out a bill of lading to his own
order. The goods having been destroyed in transit, vendor sued for purchase
price. Held,' that in the absence of an expressed intention that title should pass
to the vendee, the bill of lading to vendor's order reserved full title and risk of
loss in the vendor.2 Gerde-Newman & Co. v. Louisiana Stores, Inc., 144 So.
756 (La. App. 1932).
Partly as a matter of business expediency, and partly because it is usually
the last act of the vendor, delivery to a carrier in accordance with the contract
has been regarded both at common law 3 and under the Uniform Sales Act,4 as
presumptive evidence of the time at which title passes to the vendee. This presumption that title passes is manifestly strengthened where an accompanying
bill of lading makes the goods deliverable to vendee.5 The difficult situation
arises when the bill of lading makes the goods deliverable to the name or order
of the vendor. What effect may be given to a bill of lading running to the
vendor's order, in reference to the transfer of title to the goods shipped, is
expressed in section 20 (2) of the Uniform Sales Act as follows: "Where the
goods are shipped and by the bill of lading the goods are deliverable to the seller
or his agent, the seller thereby reserves the property in the goods. But if, except
for the form of the bill of lading, the property would have passed to the buyer
on shipment of the goods, the seller's property in the goods shall be deemed to
be only for the purpose of securing performance by the buyer under the contract." It is clear that in the absence of an expressed intention (which case is
provided for under Section 18) 6 a bill of lading to the vendor's order will
reserve to the vendor at least a security title.7 But when, if ever, it will reserve
more than a mere security title is not altogether certain. In cases where the
surrounding circumstances independent of the shipment (i. e. prepayment of
purchase price, previous usage), are sufficient to justify the inference that title
was intended to pass at delivery to the carrier, it is agreed that the title reserved
is only for the purpose of securing performance." Conversely, if the nature of
the transaction or custom of the trade, disclose an intention that title should not
pass until some further event takes place, (i. e. payment, actual delivery, inspection), the courts are in unison to the effect that full and complete title is reserved
by a bill of lading to the vendor's orderY The important problem, howeverone which is covered, but, it is submitted, not successfully treated by section
20 (2) is the rather common case in which there is no evidence other than the
'Although there were present other influencing elements, the court quotes the holding in
the text as the correct rule.
'Although Louisiana has not adopted the Uniform Sales Act it does have the Uniform
Bills of Lading Act. The section involved in the instant case is common to both Acts.
'Snee v. Prescott, I Atk. 245 (Eng. 1743) ; Dutton v. Solomonson, 3 Bos. & P. 582 (Eng.
i8o3) ; BENjA IN, SALEs (6th ed. 1920) 394.
AI U. L. A. (1931) § i9, rule 4 (2) ; see Duralith Corp. v. Leonard, 274 Mass. 397, 174
N. E. 511 (931).
Accord: ENGLISH SALE OF GOODS Acr (884) § i8, rule 5 (2).
'Georgia Marble Wks. v. Minor, 128 Ark. 124, 193 S. W. 498 (917); Wigton v. Bowley,
133 Mass. 252 (1881). Accord: UNIFORM SALES Acr §20 (3). For modern cases under it,
see I U. L. A. (193i) §20, rule 3. WAITE, SALES (1921) 56; 1 WI.LISTON, SALES (2d ed.
1924) § 285; 1 MEcHEm, SALEs (190)

§ 789.

SALES Acr § i8 provides that the intention of the parties should govern.
'WILLSTON, op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 282-4. Glanzer v. Ormsby Co., 100 Misc. 476, 165
N. Y. Supp. ioo6 (1917) (other evidence consisted of contracting for risk of loss). A
reservation of security title is a reservation of property in goods for the purpose of securing
performance by the vendee. The beneficial interest vests in the vendee upon whom falls the
risk of loss.
WILL STON, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 284.
"See WAITF, op. cit. supra note 5, at 55 et seq.
'UNIFORM
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fact that a bill of lading was taken out to the vendor's order at the time of shipment. It will be observed that the section (quoted in full supra) is susceptible
of two interpretations. Construing the section so as to give each sentence its
fullest meaning, the first sentence may be considered a general statement of the
rule that a vendor may reserve full title by taking out the bill of lading in his
own name."0 The second sentence, reserving security title, may then be regarded
as an exception which applies only to cases in which there is outside and independent evidence tending to show that the parties contemplated the passing of
title.11 Under this view it is evident that since the facts of the problem case, by
hypothesis, contain no other evidence, the vendor will be adjudged to have reserved full title in himself for all purposes. But the result thus obtained is
directly opposed to the decisions of the majority of courts including some of
the most competent benches. 2 In arriving at their conclusions these courts have
held, in effect, that in the problem case (i. e. facts limited to shipment of goods
with a bill of lading to vendor's order) title would have passed to the vendee
"except for the form of the bill of lading" on the ground that delivery to the
carrier raised the necessary presumption. But, since this entails the necessity
of giving force to the presumption that title passes upon delivery to a carrier,
in a case where the reason for the presumption is not present, it is suggested that
such a construction is unsound. 13 In any event section 20 (2) is evidently open
to inconsistent interpretations. 4 A shortcoming in any statute, this fault is particularly unfortunate in a uniform act. It is suggested, therefore, that a rephrasing of the section, perhaps to correspond with the unambiguous language of the
English Sale of Goods Act, 5 would fulfill more effectually the fundamental
purpose of securing uniformity.'"
TORTs-LIABILITY

OF

INSURANCE

COMPANY FOR

NEGLIGENCE OF ITS

PHYSICIAN-Plaintiff suffered a broken leg in the course of his employment
without any negligence on the part of the employer.

Compensation was duly

State v. Federal Sales Co., 172 La. 921, 136 So, 4 (1931) ; Rylance v. James Walker
Co., 129 Md. 475, 99 Atl. 597 (1916).

' Rylance v. James Walker Co., supra note IO.
'Standard Casing Co. v. California Casing Co., 233 N. Y. 413, 135 N. E. 834 (1922);
Kellogg v. Hewitt, 133 Misc. 6og, 233 N. Y. Supp. 94 (1929).
'Admittedly the sole basis for the rule that delivery to a carrier raises a presumption of
an intention to pass title, is that in the absence of other evidence of intention, the probabilities are in favor of an intention then to make a final appropriation to the bargain. The delivery is valuable, therefore, only in so far as it reveals such an intention. Where, however,
the vendor, by taking out a bill of lading to his own order, explains with what thought the
delivery was made, both his acts should be considered as one. It is erroneous, therefore, to
think of the matter as though delivery to the carrier raised a presumption which was rebutted by the form of the bill of lading. Both acts are inseparable parts of a single transaction.
In interpreting that clause of section 2o (2) which reads that "if except for the form
of the bill of lading title would pass", it is evident that in determining whether "title would
pass" courts may not look to delivery to the carrier as raising such a presumption. Its entire effect having been absorbed in the bill of lading, the removal from consideration of the
bill of lading leaves the act of delivery devoid of any significance whatever. Therefore, the
view is illogical which holds that (evidence of intention being limited to the shipment of the
goods with the bill of lading to the vendor's order) since title would otherwise have passed,
(on the grounds of delivery to a carrier) the vendor is reserving a mere security title.
" Under the first view, as outlined in the text, the vendor will be held to reserve full title
where the evidence is limited to the shipment of the goods with a bill of lading running to
the vendor's order. Under the second view, with the same facts controlling, the vendor will
be held to be reserving merely security title.
' "Where goods are shipped, and by the bill of lading the goods are deliverable to the
order of the seller or his agent, the seller is prinza facie deemed to reserve the right to dispose." (1894) § I9 (2).
" See Hargest, Keeping the Uniform State Laws Uniform (927) 76 U. OF PA. L. Rv.
178; HOAR, CoNDITIONAL. SALES (1929) 53.
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made. The employer carried accident insurance' and the defendant insurance
company, in order to decrease expenses, had the plaintiff removed to its own
hospital. To the knowledge of the defendant's agent, the attending physician
refractured the leg, and in order to keep plaintiff in ignorance thereof, he refrained from placing it in a cast. As a result plaintiff suffered additional
injuries. Held, that the defendant company was liable for the negligence of
the physician on the ground that he was its agent. Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation,Ltd. v. Bell, C. C. A. 3d, Mar. 3, 1933.
This case presents an anomalous situation. The question of the liability
of a third person to an employee, for aggravation of an original injury by the
malpractice of a physician, has arisen in the following ways: (i) common law
action against employer; (2) action against employer or insurer under workmen's compensation laws; (3) action against physician after receipt of compensation from employer or insurer. Where there is a common law action against
the employer, the general rule is that the malpractice of the physician is proximately connected with the defendant's fault. 2 Usually the same result is obtained
where the action is against the employer or insurer under workmen's compensation." But where the physician is being sued after receipt of compensation
there is considerable conflict.- Some courts permit recovery if the compensation received by the employee does not include the aggravation. Others sustain
the plaintiff even if full recovery has been had against the employer or insurance company." Still others deny recovery in either case.7 The decisions in
these cases invariably turn on a consideration of proximate consequences. The
present case, however, does not fall within the customary analysis because the
insurance was not for compensation but for medical expenses.8 It is not difficult to understand why the court swung under the agency doctrine. Proximate
consequence being inapplicable, agency was the next convenient doctrine to turn
to. Though convenient, there is little doubt that agency is a strained concept
here. Mr. Justice Holmes has said: "There is no more distinct calling than
that of the doctor, and none in which the employ6 is more distinctly free from
the control or direction of his employer." 9 It would seem better to hold simply
that an insurance company which supplies a physician under its duty to compensate for medical treatment is responsible for the negligent conduct of such
physician under circumstances where the company knew of the purported conduct and realized its dangers, but did not exercise its power to prevent it.'"
'The policy provided that the company would furnish reasonabl6 surgery and medical
expenses, medicine and supplies as and when needed.
'Gray v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 215 Mass. 8, IO2 N. E. 71 (1913).
' See cases cited in Note (1925) 39 A. L. R. 1276.
'Leidy, MalpracticeActions and Compensation Acts (1931) 29 MicH. L. REv. 568. See
also Note (1933) 82 A. L. R. 932.
Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Pugh, 2o6 Wis. 62, 238 N. W. 872 (931 ).
'Smith v. Golden State Hospital, iii Cal. App. 667, 296 Pac. 127 (1931); Hoffman v.
Houston Clinic, 41 S. W. (2d) 134 (Tex. 1931).
'Vatalaro v. Thomas, 262 Mass. 383, 16o N. E. 269 (1928) ; Pitkin v. Chapman, 121
Misc. 88, 2oo N. Y. Supp. 235 (1923).
'This case is simply a question of the liability of an insurance company for acts of a
physician chosen by it to treat the subject matter of the insurance. The problem of aggravation does not even enter. The same problem would have arisen here if the doctor had negligently broken the other leg.
'Pearl v. West End St. Ry. Co., x76 Mass. 177, 57 N. E. 339 (I9oo).
'0 It is interesting to speculate on the importance of the element of knowledge in this
case. The court employed it as one of the factors in determining the agency relationship.
Without it, the case might well have turned the other way. If we accept it as a requisite for
liability in this case, then we could say that recovery was based on the negligence of the defendant, since it had knowledge of the danger and actual ability to prevent it. An interesting
question might arise if the defendant's agent knows of certain purported conduct which would
amount to negligence on the part of the physician, but which an ordinary layman could not
be expected to realize involved danger. If recovery were allowed in such a situation it would
be a square case of liability for the negligence of a physician.
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ON
RIGHT
TRUST
PROPERTY-PREFERENTIAL
TRUSTS-FOLLOWING
LIQUIDATION OF PLEDGOR WHOSE COLLATERAL HAS BEEN WRONGFULLY SOLD
BY BANK'S AGENT AND PROCEEDS DEPOSITED COVERING His PRIOR UNLAWFUL
WITHDRAWAL OF THE SAME AMOUNT, WHICH PROCEEDS ARE SUBSEQUENTLY
MINGLED WITH BANK'S OTHER MONEY-Claimants pledged shares with Trust
Company as collateral security for a note. On January 21St, without knowledge

of claimants, the note not being in default, said shares were sold by brokers for
the account of the Trust Company at the order of the treasurer. On the same
day, the treasurer stole from the Trust Company a sum equal to the proceeds of
the -sale, and debited the account of Correspondent Bank. The following day,
January 22nd, the proceeds of the sale of claimants' collateral were deposited
by the brokers in Correspondent Bank which credited them as a collection item
to Trust Company's account. In the liquidation of Trust Company, claimants
sought to recover as preferred creditors the balance remaining after payment of
the note. Held, that claimants were entitled to a preference, but only to the
extent of the lowest balance of Trust Company's account with Correspondent
Bank at any time after the proceeds of the sale were deposited. Appeal of
Mehler, 309 Pa. 370, 164 Atl. 619 (1932).

The right of an individual to follow and reclaim misapplied funds or converted property which were held in trust for him is merely the right of an
owner to pursue and retake his own until it reaches a bona fide purchaser.'

Formerly the right was limited to an identification of the very property misapplied, then it was extended to the segregated proceeds of such property,2 and
now the principles of equitable lien and constructive trust are applied, subject
to limitation, to proceeds confused with similar property.3 In the instant case it
was argued by the counsel for the Secretary of Banking, representing the depositors, that Trust Company did not receive, or at least did not retain the proceeds of the sale. The transaction was merely a means by which the treasurer
transferred the proceeds from the brokers to himself, being identical with that
of a sale of bonds for a customer, except that the proceeds were received a day
earlier. The assets of Trust Company were never increased thereby, but rather

the Company was a conduit. 4 The court, however, refused to overlook the time

element, and held that the proceeds of the sale could not be taken before they
were received.5 It might have been argued that the stealing of the money created
a debt to Trust Company, and that in the payment of a pre-existing debt with
stolen money, the recipient was a bona fide purchaser.6 While the case is interesting in that it presents a problem as to whether the trustee ex maleficio re-

ceived the proceeds of the beneficiary's property, it is also of extreme importance
in that it changes, or at least presents a fresh example of, the Pennsylvania law
as to tracing money wrongfully mingled by a bank with its'other money. At an
early date it was almost universally held that since money had no earmark, when
it was mingled with that of the trustee, it could not be traced.7 This was sub-

'Spokane County v. First Nat. Bank, 68 Fed. 979 (C. C. A. 9th, 1895) ; Cavin v. Gleason, l05 N. Y. 256, II N. E. 504 (1887); Thompson's Appeal, 22 Pa. 16 (1853); Taylor v.
Plumer, 3 M. & S. 575 (Eng. i815).
IFrelinghuysen v. Nugent, 36 Fed. 229, 239 (C. C. D. N. J. 1888). Cf. Bishop v. Mahoney, 70 Minn. 238, 73 N. W. 6 (1897).
Scott, The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully Mingled with- Other Money (1913) 27
I-ARv. L. REv. 125.

' Appellee's Paper Book, No. 148, March Term, 1932.

' Instant case at 37, 164 Atl. at 621.
6See Weston, Money Stolen from One Trust Used for Another (1912) 25 HARv. L. REV.
602, adversely criticizing Newell v. Hadley, 2o6 Mass. 335, 92 N. E. 507 (19IO), which case
held that an estate receiving funds stolen from another is liable for amounts expended to
creditors' but not to beneficiaries.
IWhitecomb v. Jacob, i Salk, 161 (Eng. 1710) ; Ex porte Dale and Co., iI Ch. D. 772
(1879).
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sequently repudiated in England and other jurisdictions.8 In Pennsylvania,
although a preference has been allowed to the beneficiary in the case of an
individual trustee,9 it was refused where the trustee was a trust company. 10
This was true even when the commingling was done in an account in a separate
bank."- From this strict view the pendulum swung to the other extreme and
it was thought unnecessary to trace the funds beyond a deposit with the bank.' -2
Since a bank's transactions are purely bookkeeping, and since the bank would
profit by its own wrongful act of commingling, the latter rule would seem to be
most equitable. 1" It is law in the federal courts and an increasing majority of
jurisdictions.' 4 The instant case would seem to be an unfortunate reversion to
the principles developed in the case of an individual trustee applied to a highly
developed business of trusteeship, and one which in the ordinary case is most
likely to result in loss to innocent individuals with no compensating utility. "
' Knatchfull v. Hallett, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696 (Eng. x879) is the leading case on the
subject and has been followed in most jurisdictions.
IWebb v. Newhall, 274 Pa. 135, 117 Atl. 793 (1922) (distinguished a bank from an individual trustee) ; Vosburgh's Est., 279 Pa. 329, 123 Atl. 813 (1924); Trestrail v. Johnson,
298 Pa. 388, 148 At. 493 (1929).
' Lebanon Trust and Safe Deposit Bank's Assigned Estate, Carmany's Appeal, 166 Pa.
622, 31 At. 334 (1895) (subsequently distinguished as not a trustee ex maleficio, although
this should not effect the problem); Cobson's Estate, 3 Pa. Super. 244 (1897); Miller's
Appeal, 218 Pa. 5o, 66 Atl. 995 (1907).
' Com. v. Tradesmen's Co. (No. 2), 250 Pa. 378, 95 Atl. 577 (1i95). The similarity to
the instant case of the mingling of the money, while not shown in the report is clearly evident
from the record. The opinion carried on the distinction between a bank and an individual
trustee. It is highly probable that the court was following Miller's Appeal, supra note io, in
refusing preference to one cestui que trust, where the funds of many others were in same
account. But rather than give them nothing, a pro rata distribution or the rule of Clayton's
Case should be applied.
Connantville Bank's Assigned Estate, 28o Pa. 545, 124 Atl. 745 (924) held that Webb
v. Newhall, supra note 9, in distinguishing an individual from a bank, meant by the latter a
depositor relationship. The extreme was definitely reached in Cameron v. Carnegie Trust
Company, 292 Pa. 114, 14o Atl. 768 (1928) ; In re Susquehanna Title and Trust Co., 16 D. &
C. 530 (Pa. 1932). Both counsel in the instant case treated these decisions as controlling
and requiring no tracing beyond an augmentation of the bank's assets; therefore the point
was not argued.
' See Covitt, The Legal Effect of Insolvency on Bank Deposits (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 39o; Lewis, Tracing Mingled Trust Funds (933) 15 PA. BAR. AssN. QUART. 23.
" Montague v. Pacific Bank, 81 Fed. 6o2 (N. D. Cal. 1897) ; Reichert v. United Savings
Bank, 255 Mich. 685, 239 N. W. 393 (1931) ; Blummer v. Scandinavian Amer. State Bank,
169 Minn. 89, 21o N. W. 865 (1926) ; People v. City Bank of Rochester, 96 N. Y. 32 (1884).

The injustice can no longer arise in regard to collection, since the Bank Collection Act
of 1931, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit.7, 224 (b).

